Omar C. Jadwat

People were already in the air when President Trump signed Executive Order 13769 on January 27, 2017. After passengers arriving in the United States were detained, Omar Jadwat and his team worked through the night with lawyers and students from the National Immigration Law Center, the International Refugee Assistance Project and Yale’s Workers and Immigrants Rights Advocacy Clinic. They prepared a lawsuit for two detained Iraqi men and others in the same position.

The order immediately suspended entry for ninety days from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. It paused the refugee program for 120 days, suspended Syrian refugee admissions indefinitely and directed future preferences toward certain religious minorities. Visa holders and refugees encountered those provisions while families, universities, resettlement organizations and employers awaited them.

The administration invoked national security and inadequate information from the designated countries. Jadwat and his colleagues examined the directive alongside campaign statements, transition proposals and the preference based on religion. Their constitutional argument required the courts to consider how the policy had developed, including the possibility that country designations carried forward an announced religious exclusion.

Jadwat went on to argue the Maryland injunction proceedings in International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump. The ACLU, ACLU of Maryland, National Immigration Law Center and other counsel represented organizations and individuals; IRAP itself was among the plaintiffs. Within six weeks of the January directive, the government replaced it, changing the country list, refugee provisions, exceptions and effective date.

The Second Order Removes Iraq

Executive Order 13780, issued March 6, removed Iraq. It also dropped the indefinite Syrian-refugee suspension and express religious-minority preference, delayed implementation and expressly exempted lawful permanent residents. The ninety-day entry restriction now covered Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen; the 120-day refugee pause remained.

The replacement supplied country-specific explanations, categorical exceptions and case-by-case waivers. It described the entry pause as time to improve screening and review information. The government maintained that these changes, its statutory entry authority and the President’s responsibility for foreign affairs and security justified the revised order.

Jadwat said, “Putting a new coat of paint on the Muslim ban doesn’t solve its fundamental problem.” The plaintiffs amended their complaint on March 10 and asked for relief before the replacement took effect. His argument was that the revised text had to be read with the statements, sequence and decisions that produced it.

The declarations gave that argument a personal consequence. John Doe #1 and John Doe #3 were Muslim lawful permanent residents whose wives remained in Iran. They faced continued separation as well as anxiety about their own safety and place in the United States. HIAS and IRAP described disrupted refugee work and relatives still awaiting reunion; the Middle East Studies Association faced barriers to its members’ travel, fieldwork and annual conference.

On March 16, Judge Theodore Chuang enjoined Section 2(c), the six-country entry restriction. He found the plaintiffs’ injuries and the public record sufficient for preliminary relief under the Establishment Clause. The court’s inquiry reached the President’s own statements and those of his advisers, including their descriptions of continuity between the two orders.

Purpose Before Thirteen Judges

On May 8, 2017, Jadwat presented the IRAP appellees’ argument to thirteen active judges of the Fourth Circuit sitting en banc. Before the hearing, he explained how he approached a closely watched argument: “you focus entirely on what’s going on in the room.”

He asked the judges to consider statements, timing and design together with the revised wording. The record included Trump’s explanation that he had shifted from speaking about Muslims to speaking about territories, and advisers’ descriptions of the second order as preserving the first order’s basic policy. The claimed constitutional purpose could be tested against those public choices.

The government urged deference to an entry decision involving national security. It stressed nationality rather than religion, countries Congress and earlier administrations had already identified as security concerns, and a temporary review period. Its position would limit the use of statements outside the order to challenge the policy expressed within it.

On May 25, the court affirmed the central injunction by a 10–3 vote. Chief Judge Roger Gregory’s majority found the challengers likely to succeed because the stated security rationale appeared secondary to a predominantly religious purpose. Jadwat’s argument had brought the affected individuals’ declarations and the work of the coalition before the full court.

The concern also reached his own family. Jadwat had seen the value, for Muslim relatives overseas, of being able to visit the United States and experience fair treatment and religious tolerance. He worried about replacing that experience with discrimination.

Expiration Before Argument

On June 26, the Supreme Court granted review and allowed part of the revised order to operate. It preserved the injunction for people with a credible claim of a bona fide relationship to a person or entity in the United States, while permitting restrictions against others during the pending merits review.

Section 2(c)’s ninety-day restriction expired on September 24, the day the President issued a third instrument. On October 10, before hearing the merits, the Supreme Court vacated the Fourth Circuit judgment and directed dismissal of that challenge as moot. Jadwat was counsel of record for the IRAP respondents.

The vacated judgment no longer carried precedential force. The new proclamation required another challenge, additional pleadings and a fresh request for relief. Counsel carried forward the injuries and evidence of purpose while addressing the provisions now governing entry.

The Third Instrument

Proclamation 9645 followed a worldwide review and imposed different restrictions on Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, Venezuela and Yemen. Iraq received enhanced screening without the same entry restrictions. Sudan left the list; North Korea and Venezuela joined it.

The proclamation distinguished between immigrant and nonimmigrant visas, exempted lawful permanent residents and other categories, provided case-by-case waivers and required continuing review. Its country-specific findings and more developed administrative process gave the government new grounds on which to defend the restrictions.

Jadwat was among the lawyers who argued the Maryland challenge. His public response again emphasized continuity across the revisions. On October 17, Chuang enjoined large portions of the proclamation for people with bona fide relationships in the United States, finding that the history still supported preliminary Establishment Clause relief despite the new review and provisions.

The government relied on the global review and the different treatment of different countries, including Iraq’s screening, Sudan’s removal and, later, Chad’s removal. It maintained that those changes and the accompanying exceptions reflected security judgments rather than religious disfavor.

A Different Advocate, the Same Record

Cecillia Wang presented the appellees’ argument when the Fourth Circuit heard the third-order appeal en banc on December 8, 2017. Jadwat joined the brief as part of the IRAP team. On February 15, 2018, the court affirmed the injunction by a 9–4 vote.

The majority considered the predominantly Muslim country coverage, the history and statements preceding each version, and the asserted national-security process. It treated the worldwide review as relevant to the purpose inquiry without finding that it ended the constitutional claim before final adjudication.

The dissenters and government emphasized the Executive’s access to classified information, diplomatic cooperation, document-reliability assessments, overstay data and threat analysis. They argued that courts lacked the information and institutional competence to displace a facially neutral entry policy supported by a worldwide review.

Jadwat became counsel of record for the IRAP respondents in Supreme Court case No. 17-1270. They filed a memorandum while their judgment awaited review alongside the separate Hawaii litigation. The Supreme Court heard no separate oral argument in IRAP.

What Hawaii Upheld

Trump v. Hawaii came from the Ninth Circuit. At the April 25, 2018 argument, Solicitor General Noel Francisco appeared for the government and Neal Katyal for the respondents. Jadwat represented the respondents in the parallel IRAP case.

On June 26, Chief Justice John Roberts’s five-Justice majority held that section 1182(f) gave the President broad authority to suspend entry upon finding it detrimental to United States interests. The proclamation’s detailed findings and review process satisfied the statute under the Court’s deferential standard.

The majority also rejected the Establishment Clause challenge under rational-basis review. It found a rational connection to screening and information-sharing goals in the worldwide review, varying country treatment, restrictions on North Korea and specified Venezuelan officials, removal of Iraq, Sudan and later Chad from entry restrictions, and the waiver system.

Justice Stephen Breyer, joined by Justice Elena Kagan, focused on whether the waivers worked as represented. Justice Sonia Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, viewed the anti-Muslim statements and policy sequence as evidence that the asserted security rationale had not cured the constitutional defect.

Two days later, the Court granted review in IRAP, vacated the Fourth Circuit judgment and remanded for reconsideration under Hawaii. The Supreme Court’s ruling now controlled the challenge to the third proclamation.

Revocation, Then Reissue

President Joseph Biden revoked Proclamation 9645 on January 20, 2021, directing agencies to resume visa processing and address applications affected by the restrictions.

On June 4, 2025, Proclamation 10949 imposed full entry restrictions for twelve countries and partial restrictions for seven. It cited screening, identity management, information sharing, visa-overstay rates, public safety and cooperation in accepting removable nationals, while retaining categorical and case-by-case national-interest exceptions.

A December successor took effect on January 1, 2026. It continued or added full restrictions for nineteen countries, partial restrictions for twenty, and a separate restriction for travel documents issued or endorsed by the Palestinian Authority.

These were distinct policies, each with its own text, administrative record and affected people. They again invoked section 1182(f) through country findings, differentiated visa treatment, exemptions, discretionary exceptions, engagement with foreign governments and periodic review. Each left its own statutory and constitutional questions to be examined.

Congress’s Removal Procedures

Jadwat continues to direct the ACLU Immigrants’ Rights Project, which he joined as a fellow in 2002. His work on entry and asylum restrictions also reached the RAICES litigation over a separate 2025 proclamation. He was on the appellees’ appellate brief; Lee Gelernt presented their argument.

On April 24, 2026, the D.C. Circuit held that the power to suspend entry under section 1182(f) did not authorize the Executive to replace Congress’s removal procedures or deny the prescribed opportunity to seek asylum and withholding protections to people physically present in the country. Hawaii addressed entry restrictions; this case concerned how the government could remove people already here.

The court affirmed summary judgment for the plaintiffs and class certification with a clarified definition. For Jadwat and the team, the statutory question had a concrete consequence: the government had to respect Congress’s procedures and protections when seeking to remove the people covered by the judgment.